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CSX Corp. v. Children's Investment Fund Management and
the Need for SEC Expansion of Beneficial Ownership*

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of a severe economic crisis, the country's attention
has focused increasingly on financial markets regulation. Prompting
this heightened attention is the perception that the inadequacy of the
current market regulations has been a precipitating force in the
current economic turmoil.' The hedge fund2 industry is one industry
that has taken advantage of this limited regulation to grow rapidly
and increase its market impact.' Consequently, there has been an
increase in the number and size of so-called "activist funds," which
are hedge funds that seek to affect the governance and control of
companies in which they invest.'
Activist funds' strategies for
exerting influence over target companies pose challenges for
corporate governance and the federal securities laws' current
disclosure requirements.'
* Copyright © 2009 by Brian T. Sullivan.
1. See Justin Fox, Pointing Fingers: The Financial Crisis Blame Game, TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,186904_1869040,00.htmi (last
visited Apr. 8, 2009) (listing the top twelve reasons for America's recent economic crisis);
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate: How to Get Out of the FinancialCrisis, TIME, Oct. 17,
2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1851739,00.html.
2. A hedge fund is "an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets,
whose interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as
an investment company under the Investment Company Act." STAFF REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
3. See Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global FinancialMarket
Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 1, 12-19 (2007). The total number of hedge funds is over 13,000, and their
impact on financial markets is enhanced by their high trading levels. Id. at 12-16. For a
discussion of the history of hedge fund regulation, or the lack thereof, and a plan for
effective future regulation, see generally id.
4. Id. at 6-7; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1029 (2007) (Activist funds
try "to influence the business strategy and management of corporations."). "This activism
takes a variety of forms, from public pressure on a ... company to change its business
strategy, to the running of a proxy contest to gain seats on the board of directors, to
litigation against present or former managers." Kahan & Rock, supra, at 1029.
5. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1022; William Savitt, The Dilemma of Empty
Voting: When Votes are Cast by Investors with No Stake in a Corporation, Rationalefor
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The recent case, CSX Corp. v. Children's Investment Fund
Management (UK) LLP,6 highlighted the conflict between hedge fund

strategies for influencing corporate policy and Securities and
Exchange Commission7 ("SEC") disclosure requirements for the
mass accumulation of securities.' One of the defendants in the case
was The Children's Investment Fund Management ("Children's
Fund"), an activist hedge fund attempting to increase CSX
Corporation's ("CSX") value by pursuing changes in the management
and control of the company.9 Children's Fund, however, did not
invest in CSX in the traditional manner by buying shares of the
company's stock, but rather obtained an economic interest in the
shares through the use of derivative investments known as total
return equity swaps ("TRSs"). 1° By using swaps, Children's Fund
believed it could gain an influential interest in CSX without triggering
SEC disclosure requirements for accumulations of stock that could
shift corporate control." In the first major case to address this issue,
the court disagreed, holding that the fund used a scheme to avoid
disclosure and should be deemed the "beneficial owner" of the shares
held by its counterparties. 12 This rendered the fund beneficial owner
Vote Is Imperiled, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 2008, at S1 ("[N]ontraditional derivative-based
corporate ownership and voting arrangements have moved from the fringes to the
mainstream, raising questions about prevailing disclosure regimes ....
").
6. 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008 WL 4222848 (2d
Cir. Sept. 15, 2008). The decision was affirmed only with regard to the denial of CSX's
claim for enjoining Children's Fund from voting the CSX shares that it owned at the
annual meeting. The other issues remain on appeal.
7. The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and is the primary regulatory body for securities transactions. JAMES D. Cox
ET AL., CORPORATIONS 707 (1997).
8. If a person acquires more than five percent of a company's securities, disclosures
must be sent to the SEC, the company, and any exchange on which the security is traded.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). The disclosures must include, among other things, the
"background, identity, and residence" of the security owner, the "source and amount of
the funds" used to purchase the securities, any plans to change the control or structure of
the corporation, and the number of shares the person owns or has a "right to acquire." Id.
9. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
10. For a description of TRSs and the mechanics of the transaction, see infra notes
28-36 and accompanying text.
11. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 517. Disclosing the swap positions would have
made Children's Fund's possible takeover plans public and likely resulted in an increase in
share price, making it more expensive for the fund to purchase additional shares. Id. at
523. Children's Fund's disclosure avoidance also allowed it to conceal its interest in the
company until a time of its choosing, a strategy the court labeled an "ambush." Id.
12. Id. at 517 ("Rule 13d-3(b) ...provides in substance that one who creates an
arrangement that prevents the vesting of beneficial ownership as part of a plan or scheme
to avoid the disclosure that would have been required if the actor bought the stock
outright is deemed to be a beneficial owner of those shares. That is exactly what the
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of enough shares to trigger the SEC's disclosure requirements, and
therefore, the fund's failure to timely disclose its positions violated
federal securities laws. The court's decision addressed a number of
issues of first impression, but the two most controversial were: (1)
whether Children's Fund was the beneficial owner of shares held by
its counterparties in the total return equity swap agreements; and (2)
whether Children's Fund used the swap transactions as part of a
scheme to avoid disclosure. 3
This Recent Development argues that, although the current SEC
definition of "beneficial ownership" should be expanded to cover an
economic interest in securities arising out of total return equity swaps,
the court's decision to deem Children's Fund a beneficial owner of
CSX shares held by its counterparties was an improper judicial
expansion of the term under current SEC guidelines. First, this
Recent Development will briefly overview the major securities laws
and their impact on hedge funds and hedge fund investment
strategies. Next, it will analyze the CSX Corp. decision in light of the
plain language of the disclosure rule, prior case law, and SEC
guidance, concluding that the court's decision to deem Children's
Fund the beneficial owner of its counterparties' CSX shares
incorrectly expands the definition of beneficial ownership. Finally,
this Recent Development asserts that while the definition of
beneficial ownership should be expanded to cover economic interests
arising from total return equity swaps, expansion should come from
the SEC, not the courts. The SEC, as opposed to the court system, is
in the best position to expand the definition and provide muchneeded clarity and uniformity.
I.

THE SECURITIES LAWS AND HEDGE FUND REGULATION

Securities are primarily regulated through five federal statutes
that focus on disclosure. The relevant laws are contained in the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),14 the Securities Exchange

defendants did here in amassing their swap positions. In consequence, defendants are
deemed to be the beneficial owners of the referenced shares.").
13. See id.
14. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). The Securities Act covers
the issuance of stock to the public and requires registration with the SEC and
dissemination of a prospectus disclosing information necessary for potential investors to
make an informed investment decision. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 695. The goal of the
Act is to prevent securities fraud by disclosing the details of the securities offering to
potential investors. Id. at 697.
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Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 5 the Investment Company Act of

the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,17 and the SarbanesOxley Act.' 8 The regulatory provision at issue in CSX Corp.-and
thus, in this Recent Development-was part of the Williams Act, 19
passed in 1968. The Williams Act amended the Exchange Act of 1934
1940,16

and added five new sections aimed at addressing a rash of corporate

takeovers.20 One of those additions, section 13(d), requires a person
to disclose the acquisition of "more than a five percent beneficial
ownership" of a public company's securities."' This section, central to
the CSX Corp. decision, seeks to prevent the secret accumulation of
large blocks of corporate securities that could shift corporate

control. 2
Hedge funds, as entities, have avoided regulation under the

major securities laws by strategically structuring themselves to take
advantage of available exemptions.23

The primary reason funds

15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). The Exchange
Act's scope is much broader than that of the Securities Act, and it governs all securities
transactions occurring after the initial offering. COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 707. The
Exchange Act is aimed at "supervision and maintenance of the integrity of the
marketplace." Id. The Exchange Act also includes a general antifraud provision, which,
in addition to combating fraud, is frequently used to address insider trading violations. Id.
at 711.
16. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2006).
17. Investment Advisers Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006).
18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). Interestingly, the enactment of each piece of
legislation tended to follow closely on the heels of a major economic crisis, indicating that
securities regulation has been more reactionary than proactive in nature. See Pearson &
Pearson, supra note 3, at 49. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act closely followed
the 1929 stock market crash. Id. The Investment Company Act and the Investment
Advisers Act were passed in response to the Great Depression. Id. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act was enacted in the wake of Enron and other similar corporate scandals. Id. Given
this history, it would be no surprise to witness another wave of regulations in response to
the current economic crisis.
19. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), 78n(f) (2006).
20. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.1 (rev. 5th
ed., 2005). See generally Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal
Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211 (2007) (discussing the history and
shortcomings of federal takeover regulation).
21. HAZEN, supra note 20, §11.1.
22. See CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511,538
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008 WL 4222848 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2008).
23. Investments in hedge funds do qualify as securities under the Securities Act. SEC
However, the Securities Act contains an
STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-22.
exemption for nonpublic offerings to a specified class of investors, an exemption for which
hedge funds typically qualify. Id. at 14. The Exchange Act, which covers virtually all sales
of securities, only applies to entities that are considered "dealers" under the statute.
Pearson & Pearson, supra note 3, at 50. Hedge funds are thought to qualify for an
exemption from dealer status under the "trader exception." Id. Hedge funds have also
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prefer to remain unregulated is to maintain the confidentiality of their
trading strategies by avoiding the securities laws' disclosure
requirements. 4 While hedge funds have avoided SEC regulation as
entities, as investors, hedge funds remain subject to the SEC's general
disclosure and antifraud provisions because these provisions apply to
all investors." Accordingly, hedge funds are subject to section 13(d)'s
managed to avoid regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which, as its
name indicates, governs investment companies. Id. at 50-51. Exemption from this Act
generally comes under either section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note
2, at 11-13. Both exemptions require nonpublic offerings and apply to companies with less
than 100 investors or those consisting solely of investors that are "qualified purchasers,"
respectively.
Id. In general, the "qualified purchaser" classification applies to
sophisticated and high-wealth investors who are thought not to require the protection of
the statute. Id. at 12-13. Hedge funds are able to qualify for both exemptions by limiting
the number and type of investors that are allowed to participate in the fund. Id. at 11-13.
Finally, hedge fund managers have avoided registration under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 based on a de minimis exemption. Id. at 21. Because a hedge fund is
considered a single client, an adviser can support up to fourteen hedge funds before the
Act requires registration, but very few advisers ever reach this threshold. Id. The SEC
has attempted to promulgate rules directly aimed at regulating hedge fund advisers. These
attempts, however, have been largely unsuccessful. The SEC adopted a rule in 2004 that
caused many hedge fund advisers to qualify for regulation under the Investment Advisers
Act, subjecting them to registration and disclosure requirements. Pearson & Pearson,
supra note 3, at 54; see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-26879.pdf (providing background of the SEC's
decision to draft the new rule and amendments, which are codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(b)(3)-2, available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr 2008/aprqtr/pdfl17cfr275.
203(b)(3)-2.pdf). The rule, however, was short-lived. In 2006, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia declared the new hedge fund adviser rule invalid.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pearson & Pearson, supra note 3, at
56-57. Thus, hedge funds have essentially avoided regulation under all of the major
securities laws.
24. Pearson & Pearson, supra note 3, at 48. Confidentiality is important because
investors choose which funds to invest in based on the fund's success. These investors are
paying a substantial management fee and a percentage of their profits to invest in the fund
and gain access to the fund's unique trading strategy. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at
1064-65 (indicating that the management fee is typically between one and two percent of
the investor's total investment and that the fund also receives twenty percent of profits).
If funds are required to disclose information regarding their securities holdings and
trading strategies, then it becomes easier for other investors or funds to mimic their
investment strategy, which removes the fund's competitive advantage. See Gregory
Zuckerman, A Peek at Moneymakers' Cards-Hedge Fund Filings on Holdings Can Clue
Investors in on Strategy; Taking Joys on Bets Gone Awry, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2006, at
C1.
25. Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, United
States Securities & Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.govlnewsl
testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm ("[H]edge funds today remain subject to SEC regulations
and enforcement under the antifraud, civil liability, and other provisions of the federal
securities laws."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1062.
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disclosure requirements for beneficial owners 26 of more than five
percent of a company's equity securities.27 With Children's Fund
subject to section 13(d)'s provisions, the question in CSX Corp. was
whether the fund's interest in the CSX shares amounted to beneficial
ownership, thus triggering the section's disclosure requirements.

II.

THE COURT'S IMPROPER JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP

In order to understand the court's reasoning, a brief explanation
of the total return equity swap is necessary.28 In essence, a TRS is a
contract in which one party receives the cash flows that it would have
received if it owned a certain security or block of securities.2 9 In
return, that party agrees to pay interest on a specified amount of
money (called the "notional amount").30 The notional amount
generally is "the value of the referenced asset at the time the
transaction is [entered into] and may be recalculated periodically."'"
The swap involves two parties, a "short party" and a "long party."
The short party agrees to pay the long party any dividends declared
by the underlying security plus any increase in the reference security's
value.32 Typically, the short party hedges its swap position by
purchasing the reference security.33 The long party agrees to pay to
the short party interest on the notional amount of money plus any
decrease in the reference security's value.34 An equity swap is
considered a "derivative" investment because its value is derived
from the underlying reference security.35 In CSX Corp. specifically,
Children's Fund was the long party and essentially entered into
26. The term "beneficial owner" is a term of art used for the purposes of section
13(d). For a definition of beneficial ownership, see infra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
27. Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1062.
28. For a thorough explanation of the structure and purpose of Children's Fund's
total return swaps, see CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp.
2d 511, 519-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008 WL 4222848 (2d Cir. Sept. 15,
2008).
29. Kevin Dolan & Carolyn DuPuy, Equity Derivatives: Principles and Practice, 15
VA. TAX REV. 161,164 (1995).
30. Id. at 171.
31. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 520 n.13.
32. Dolan & DuPuy, supra note 29, at 171 (using "B" to represent the short party).
As a result, the long party obtains the economic interest in the reference security from the
short party. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006).
33. Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 816.
34. Dolan & DuPuy, supra note 29, at 171 (using "A" to represent the long party).
35. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
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contracts with its counterparties to receive the36 cash flows that it
would have received if it had owned CSX shares.
CSX's action against Children's Fund was grounded in the
violation of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act 37 and Rule 13d-3
promulgated thereunder.3 8 With Children's Fund subject to section
13(d)'s provisions, the question in CSX Corp. was whether the fund's
interest in the CSX shares amounted to beneficial ownership under
Rule 13d-3. In general, section 13(d) requires "beneficial owners" of
five percent or more of a company's securities to file a disclosure
statement with the company and the SEC.39 As the court stated,
"[t]he concept of 'beneficial ownership' is the foundation of [section
13(d)]."4 ° As such, Rule 13d-3's provisions set forth the definition of
beneficial ownership.4' Rule 13d-3(a) provides the general definition
of beneficial ownership, which includes any person having either
"investment" or "voting" power over the securities. 2 This definition
of beneficial ownership covers, among other things, traditional stock
ownership.4 3 Rule 13d-3(b)'s definition of beneficial ownership
supplements that of Rule 13d-3(a) by finding beneficial ownership if a
person enters into an arrangement to prevent or divest beneficial
ownership under Rule 13d-3(a) as part of a scheme to avoid section
13(d) disclosure requirements.'
The court analyzed beneficial
ownership under both subsections of Rule 13d-3. It chose not to rule
on beneficial ownership under subsection (a) but deemed Children's
Fund a beneficial owner of the CSX shares under subsection (b),
which triggered disclosure requirements.45 The fund's failure to file
timely disclosure statements was a violation of section 13(d).46

36. Id. at 521.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2008).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
40. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a).
43. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b); see CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
45. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). As a remedy for the violation, the court enjoined
Children's Fund from future violations of section 13(d). CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at
573-74. The court, however, denied CSX's claim to enjoin Children's Fund from voting its
CSX shares at the company's annual shareholder meeting. Id. at 572. This holding was
subsequently upheld in an appellate opinion limited to the claim to enjoin the voting of
CSX shares. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008
WL 4222848 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2008).
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Rule 13d-3(a)

The court's consideration of Children's Fund's beneficial
ownership began with an analysis of the definition of the term in Rule
13d-3(a). Although the court's decision was not based on subsection
(a),47 the court's analysis remains significant because future cases
interpreting beneficial ownership are likely to arise in the Southern
District of New York since it is home to Wall Street and the vast
majority of financial transactions. The Rule itself, which focuses on
voting and investment power, reads:
For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a
beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, directly
arrangement,
through any contract,
or indirectly,
understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to
direct the voting of, such security; and/or,
(2) Investment power which includes the
48 power to dispose,
or to direct the disposition of, such security.
In analyzing Children's Fund's potential beneficial ownership,
the court acknowledged that Children's Fund did not enter into an
agreement that would give it direct voting or investment power over
CSX shares. 49 Thus, the court's focus shifted to whether the fund had
indirect investment or voting power over its counterparties' shares.
The court found strong arguments that Children's Fund had the
power to influence investment and voting decisions for its
counterparties' CSX shares. The court also concluded that Children's
Fund knew that its counterparties would hedge their swap positions
by purchasing the referenced shares in amounts nearly identical to
those referenced in the swap." Given this knowledge, the question
became whether Children's Fund could affect investment or voting
power in the shares."' The court found that Children's Fund
"significantly influenced the banks to purchase the CSX shares that

47. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a).
49. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
50. Id. at 542. By the time Children's Fund filed its section 13(d) disclosure
statements it owned 4.2% of CSX's outstanding stock, a total of 17,796,998 shares, and had
exposure to an "additional 11% of CSX shares outstanding" through its swap agreements.
Keith E. Gottfried & Barry H. Genkin, U.S. District Court Rules Against Hedge Fund in
CSX Corp. v. The Children's Investment Fund et al.: Holds That Equity Swaps Were Used
to Avoid Disclosure Under Rule 13d-3(b) of the Exchange Act, WALL ST. LAW., Aug. 2008,

at 1,5.
51. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
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constituted their hedges" and "significantly influenced the banks to
sell the hedge shares when the swaps were unwound."52 Further, the
court found that there was "reason to believe that [Children's Fund]
was in a position to influence the counterparties ...with respect to

the exercise of their voting rights."53 As evidence of this, the court
pointed out that many of the swaps were moved to one particular
counterparty on the eve of CSX's annual meeting, a counterparty
over which the court believed Children's Fund had more influence.54
The court's interpretation of Rule 13d-3(a) was inconsistent with
its plain language. The facts of the case clearly indicated that
Children's Fund did not have the "power to vote" or the "power to
dispose" of the shares held by its counterparties, meaning that it
could not have been a beneficial owner under the first part of either
prong of Rule 13d-3(a) 5 Accordingly, the court focused on the
statutory language, which asked whether Children's Fund had the
power to direct the voting of or the power to direct the disposition of
such shares.56 It found "no evidence that Children's Fund explicitly
directed the banks."57 Instead of ending its inquiry there, the court
moved past the plain language of the statute to inquire into the hedge
fund's ability to influence the disposition and voting of the shares. 8
The court's influence inquiry fell outside the scope of actions
covered under Rule 13d-3(a).59 A clear distinction can be drawn
between the power to "direct" and the power to "influence," and the
latter falls outside Rule 13d-3(a)'s definition of beneficial ownership.
The SEC chose not to include "influence" over voting and disposition
in the definition of "beneficial ownership."6 Further, precedent

52. Id. at 543.
53. Id. at 546.
54. Id. at 543-44. The court offered as support for this finding a statement from the
fund's managing partner that part of the reason the swaps were moved to the particular
counterparty was that they felt the votes were more likely to go in their favor. Id. at 544.
The court also went on to suggest that Children's Fund shared a common interest in CSX
with one of the counterparties' internal hedge funds, which it believed it could exploit to
influence the votes. Id.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2008).
56. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
57. Id. at 543.
58. Id. at 546.
59. Brief of Amici Curiae International Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, Inc. and
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass'n at 3, CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund
Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Nos. 02-2899-cv(L), 08-3016-cv
(XAP)), 2008 WL 3924620 [hereinafter ISDA Brief].
60. For a discussion of potential reasons why the SEC did not include the ability to
influence the voting and disposition of shares, see id. at 16. (arguing that a vast amount of
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supports such a distinction, indicating that "power to direct" under
Rule 13d-3 is concerned with control and not influence.6 The SEC
draws this distinction itself in its letter to the court in which it stated
"[tlhe more reasonable interpretation of the terms 'voting power' and
'investment power' . . . are based on the concept of actual
authority. 6 2 As the court freely admitted, Children's Fund had no
actual authority over the voting or disposition of its counterparties'
CSX shares.63 Thus, the court's finding that Children's Fund had the
ability to influence the voting and disposition of the shares did not
constitute the "power to direct" Rule 13d-3(a) requires, and the
court's indication that such influence was sufficient to constitute
beneficial ownership was erroneous.
The court's interpretation of "beneficial ownership" under Rule
13d-3(a) is also inconsistent with SEC guidance on the Rule's scope.
The scope of beneficial ownership is broad.' Limits on the scope,
however, do exist. In particular, the SEC indicated that "economic or
business incentives, in contrast to some contract, arrangement,
understanding, or relationship concerning voting power or investment
power between the parties to an equity swap, are not sufficient to
create beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3."65
The court's
indication that there were persuasive arguments in support of
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a) is in opposition to the plain
language of the SEC's guidance. In this situation, there was no legal
or contractual obligation for the counterparties to buy, sell, or vote

actions exist that can influence the disposition of shares, many of which clearly do not

amount to beneficial ownership of the shares).
61. Id. at 14. (citing Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Invs. Ltd., 263 F. 3d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir.

2001)).
62. Letter from Brian Breheny, Deputy Dir., SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., to Judge Lewis
A. Kaplan, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y. (June 4, 2008), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publicationslDocuments/CSX-BrianBrehenyLtrToJudgeKaplan.pdf
[hereinafter SEC Letter]. It is necessary to point out that the letter submitted to the court
was not the result of a full Commission vote, but rather an opinion expressed by the

Division of Corporation Finance. Id. As a result, the letter of opinion does not receive
the same amount of deference that an opinion from the full Commission would. Id.
Opinions of the full commission are binding on the court, unless they are clearly
erroneous. The opinion of the Division of Corporation Finance is only persuasive
authority. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 551 n.205.
63. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
64. Id. at 540 (citing Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial
Ownership, Exchange Act Release No. 34-14692, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,489 (Apr. 28,
1978)).
65. SEC Letter, supra note 62. The SEC also indicated that the scope of Rule 13d-3 is

narrower than that of its overlying statutory provision, section 13(d). Id.
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"influence" that Children's Fund could have had over the investment
power of the shares would have been the economic incentive

associated with hedging the swap positions.6 7 Similarly, the only
incentive to vote according to Children's Fund's interests was the
economic benefit of fostering additional business with the Fund.
Thus, for the court to make its statement regarding the likelihood of
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a),68 it had to ignore the SEC's
guidance in regards to the Rule's scope, or at least engage in a
strained reading of that guidance.

Not only was the court's interpretation of Rule 13d-3(a)'s
beneficial ownership standard contrary to the Rule's plain language

and the SEC's interpretation thereof, it was also inconsistent with
market participants' general practices and perceptions. The current
SEC Rule's failure to require disclosure for shares held by
counterparties in TRSs has been cited as a serious problem in calls for
new regulation.6 9 Proponents of regulatory change have pointed out

that "with some attention to legal niceties" TRSs "can often be
structured" so as not to trigger disclosure under Rule 13d-3(a). 7' This

conclusion is also consistent with international decisions interpreting
securities laws patterned after Rule 13d-3(a).71 In addition, the U.S.
66. CSX Corp, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541 ("The contracts embodying [Children's Fund's]
swaps did not give [Children's Fund] any legal rights with respect to the voting or
disposition of the CSX shares referenced therein. Nor did they require that its short
counterparties acquire CSX shares to hedge their positions.").
67. See, e.g., id. (indicating that the counterparty's investment decisions with regards
to CSX shares were aimed at hedging financial risks associated with the swaps, and not the
result of contractual or legal obligations).
68. In analyzing beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a), the court stated that
"there are substantial reasons for concluding that [Children's Fund] is the beneficial owner
of the CSX shares held as hedges by its short counterparties." Id. at 545.
69. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 625 (2008) (elaborating
on the importance of the decoupling problem and suggesting additional long term
solutions); Hu & Black, supra note 32 (arguing that the use of derivatives to secretly
accumulate voting interests in securities without triggering SEC disclosure requirements is
a serious problem and suggesting a number ways to remedy the current lack of
regulation).
70. Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 818; see also Savitt, supra note 5 (indicating that
interests in securities resulting from swap contracts do not usually trigger section 13(d)
disclosure requirements).
71. See Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 868-69 (discussing cases from Australia and
New Zealand in which cash settled equity swaps did not trigger disclosure requirements
similar to those under section 13(d)). In the case from New Zealand, the court indicated
that one reason for not finding beneficial ownership "was that it believed similar
disclosure would not be required in Australia, the United States, or the United Kingdom."
Id. at 837.
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law firms most familiar with the derivative markets have issued
guidance that total return equity swaps do not establish beneficial
ownership of shares held by the short counterparty under Rule 13d3(a). It would appear from the SEC's guidance in CSX Corp. that
market participants were justified in reaching such a conclusion
regarding beneficial ownership. In its letter to the court, the SEC
quite bluntly stated that "a standard cash settled equity swap
agreement, in and of itself, does not confer on a party, here the
investment fund, any voting power or investment power over the
shares a counterparty purchases to hedge its position."73 There is no
evidence, despite the court's conclusory statement indicating
otherwise,74 that the swap transactions that Children's Fund entered
into were anything but standard. The evidence and the state of the
law at the time provide a strong argument that beneficial ownership
did not exist under Rule 13d-3(a).
The court in CSX Corp. piled up arguments in support of finding
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a) only to leave the issue
unresolved because it decided the case on other grounds. As such,
the court created uncertainty in what was previously a wellestablished and objective interpretation of Rule 13d-3(a) by issuing a
substantial amount of nonbinding dicta indicating that the power to
influence investment or voting decisions may constitute beneficial
ownership.
B.

Rule 13d-3(b)

Ultimately, the court resolved the case by deeming Children's
Fund the beneficial owner of the CSX shares under Rule 13d-3(b).
The rule focuses on schemes to avoid beneficial ownership and reads:
Any person who, directly or indirectly, creates or uses a trust,
proxy, power of attorney, pooling arrangement or any other
contract, arrangement, or device with the purpose of [sic] effect
of divesting such person of beneficial ownership of a security or
preventing the vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a
plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section

72. Id. at 868 (indicating that two prominent law firms in the derivative markets have
issued guidance to their clients advising that cash settled equity swaps do not trigger
disclosure requirements under section 13(d)).
73. SEC Letter, supra note 62.
74. See CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511,541
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, No. 08-2899-cv, 2008 WL 4222848 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2008).
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13(d) or (g) of the Act shall be deemed for purposes
of such
75
sections to be the beneficial owner of such security.
The court broke down the rule into three separate elements: (1)
the use of a contract, arrangement, or device; (2) to divest or prevent
beneficial ownership; and (3) as part of a plan or scheme to avoid
section 13(d) disclosures.7 6 The first requirement is clearly satisfied as

the TRSs are contracts." The court then combined the two remaining
elements and considered whether the contract was used to divest or
or scheme to evade
prevent beneficial ownership "as part of a ' plan
78
13d.
[s]ection
of
requirements
the reporting
The court interpreted Rule 13-3(b) to cover "one [who] enters
into a transaction with the intent to create the false appearance that
there is no large accumulation of securities that might have a
potential for shifting corporate control by evading the disclosure
requirements of [s]ection 13(d) or (g) through preventing the vesting
of beneficial ownership. ' 79 Having set this standard, the court held
that Children's Fund hid its market accumulation by entering into
TRSs for the purpose of preventing beneficial ownership and
The Court found
avoiding disclosure under section 13(d).8°
"overwhelming" evidence in support of a scheme to prevent
beneficial ownership.81 The most persuasive piece of evidence cited
by the court was a comment made by the fund's chief financial officer
indicating that the swaps were used specifically to prevent triggering
the disclosure requirements.82 Thus, Children's Fund was deemed
beneficial owner of the CSX shares held by its counterparties,83 which
amounted to more than five percent of the outstanding shares and
triggered section 13(d)'s disclosure requirements.' 4 Its failure to file
the disclosure statements within ten days of breaking the five percent
threshold was a violation of section 13(d).85

75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (2006).
76. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 548-49.
79. Id. at 550.
80. Id. at 552.
81. Id. at 549.
82. Id. ("Joe O'Flynn, the chief financial officer of [Children's Fund] told its board,
albeit not in the specific context of CSX, that one of the reasons for using swaps is 'the
ability to purchase without disclosure to the market or the company.' ").
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006).
85. Id.
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The court was incorrect in deeming Children's Fund beneficial
owner of the CSX shares held by its counterparties under Rule 13d3(b). The court avoided the plain language of the SEC's guidance in
favor of a strained interpretation of Rule 13d-3(b)'s intent
requirement. In its letter, the SEC clearly stated that a party's
"underlying motive for entering into the swap transaction generally is
not a basis for determining whether there [was] 'a plan or scheme to
evade' " under Rule 13d-3(b).8 6 Yet, the court repeatedly referred to
the fact that one of Children's Fund's purposes in using the swaps was
to avoid disclosure.87 By its repeated reliance on this fact, it is clear
that while the SEC indicated that the motive for entering into a swap
has no bearing on finding a scheme to evade, the court considered
motive to be of the utmost importance. The SEC went on to state
that "enter[ing] into a swap ... with the intent to create the false

appearance of nonownership of a security" is the relevant intent for
the purpose of Rule 13d-3(b) beneficial ownership.88 The SEC has
made similar assertions in amici letters submitted in other cases,
consistently holding that economic interests without the coupled
power to control voting or disposition of the shares does not amount
to a scheme to evade.89 In Children's Fund's case, it would be
impossible to create a false appearance of nonownership because
Children's Fund never owned the shares.
Instead of relying on the false appearance of nonownership
standard laid out by the SEC, the court interpreted the letter as
creating a false appearance of non-accumulation standard.9' The
court accomplishes this incorrect interpretation by inserting
ambiguity into an SEC letter that, on its face, was clear and direct.9 '
Moreover, the court went so far as to suggest that the SEC letter
actually supports its holding.' It did so in spite of the plain language
of the letter which used words such as "rare," "unusual," and
"egregious" to describe situations where it may be possible to find

86. SEC Letter, supra note 62.
87. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51.
88. SEC Letter, supra note 62.
89. ISDA Brief, supra note 59, at 6; see Letter from Jacob H. Stillman, Solicitor, SEC
to Judge Karon 0. Bowdre, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, N.D. of Ala. (Nov. 28, 2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2006/healthsouthbrief.pdf.
90. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
91. Id. (interpreting the SEC's statement requiring " 'the intent to create the false
appearance of non-ownership of a security' " to mean the intent "to create some false
appearance, albeit not necessarily a false appearance of non-ownership" (quoting SEC
Letter, supranote 62)).
92. Id. at 549.
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beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(b) absent a "false appearance
or sham transactions. 9 3 In its closing paragraph, the letter stated that
"interpreting an investor's beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3 to
include shares used in a counter-party's hedge, absent unusual
circumstances, would be novel."'9 4 The court, however, believed that a
literal reading of the SEC letter requiring a false appearance of
nonownership
would render Rule
13d-3(b)
superfluous.95

Accordingly, the court interpreted Rule 13d-3(b) in a manner
inconsistent with the SEC's guidance and in contrast to the plain
meaning of the SEC's letter to the court on the subject.
It is helpful to consider what type of transaction would create

beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(b). In its letter, the SEC gave
the specific example of a sham transaction.96 One such transaction

may be a practice known as "parking."'
This practice involves
purchasing stock (becoming an owner of the stock) and then
transferring it to another party to hide ownership.98 The true stock
owner enters into an agreement with the transferee to repurchase the
shares and insure against loss. 99 In this situation, the false appearance

of nonownership is clear. The owner uses an arrangement to hide
stock ownership by transferring title while retaining control over
voting and disposition by promising to buy back the shares and insure
against loss.100 The argument can be made that Children's Fund's

position with regards to the shares held by its counterparties was
similar to a parking arrangement.10 '
93. SEC Letter, supra note 62 ("[I]n some unusual circumstances, a plan or scheme to
evade the beneficial ownership provisions or Rule 13d-3 might exist where the evidence
does not indicate a false appearance or sham transaction.... [T]he rare case might
present an egregious situation qualifying as a scheme to evade without also involving the
creation of a false appearance of fact.").
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550 ("An appearance of nonownership cannot be
false unless one in fact is at least a beneficial owner. That beneficial ownership would
satisfy Rule 13d-3(a), thus making Rule 13d-3(b) superfluous.").
96. SEC Letter, supra note 62.
97. For an example of a case involving a stock parking arrangement, see generally
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
98. See Brief of Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellant CSX Corporation and Affirmance at 24-25, CSX Corp. v.
Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Nos. 082899-cv(L), 08-3016-cv(XAP)), available at http://law.du.edu/documents/corporategovernance/disclosure/csx-v-the-childrens-amicus-brief-of-former.pdf
[hereinafter
Commissioners' Brief].
99. Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 869.
100. Id.
101. See Commissioners' Brief, supra note 98, at 24-25; Hu & Black, supra note 32, at
869. The argument contends that as the counterparty's economic interest in the shares
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Real and significant differences, however, exist between TRSs
and parking.'0 2 First, in the case of parking, there is actual ownership
of the shares, while, in the case of TRSs, the long party never actually
owns the shares held by its short counterparty. This distinction is
relevant because there can be a false appearance of nonownership in
a stock parking agreement, but not in a TRS, because the long party
never owns the shares. Second, and more importantly, in a parking
transaction, the person parking the stock agrees to buy back the stock
and insure against loss. 03 In contrast, in a TRS, the short party, of its
own accord, seeks to protect against loss by purchasing the shares on
the market."° In a stock parking arrangement, the stock's owner
personally eliminates the transferee's economic interest in the shares,
making it easier to exert control over voting and disposition of the
shares."OS In a TRS, however, the long party's relationship with the
shares is more strained. The long party to a TRS neither owns the
shares nor insures the counterparty against loss,0t 6 significantly
reducing the ability to control the disposition and voting of shares
held by the short party. While the two transactions may be similar,
real differences exist, differences that, in terms of Rule 13d-3(b),
mean that one falls within the definition of beneficial ownership and
one does not.
In conclusion, the court in CSX Corp. v. Children's Investment
Fund Management (UK) LLP improperly expanded the scope of
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3. Ignoring the guidance of the
SEC, prior case law, and the established understanding of market
participants, the court interpreted the rule in a manner in which
Children's Fund could not escape violation. In so doing, the court
created confusion and uncertainty surrounding beneficial ownership
as it relates to swap transactions. This is not only the opinion of those
adversely affected, but also that of the SEC, the very authority
entrusted with promulgating rules for the regulation of securities. 7

decreases, the swaps become more like a stock parking arrangement. Commissioners'
Brief, supra note 98, at 24-25 (citing Hu & Black, supra note 69 at 638-39). In Children's
Fund's case, it was argued that the counterparty's economic interest had been completely
eliminated, rendering the situation almost identical to a formal parking agreement. Id. at
25.
102. Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 869.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 868-69.
105. Id. at 868.
106. In fact, the short party is the party who protects against loss by unilaterally
deciding to purchase the shares. See id. at 868-69.
107. SEC Letter, supra note 62.
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In the concluding paragraph of its letter to the court on the very
subject, the SEC indicated that "interpreting an investor's beneficial
ownership under Rule 13d-3 to include shares used in a counterparty's hedge, absent unusual circumstances ... would create

significant uncertainties for investors who have used equity swaps in
accordance with accepted market practices understood to be based on
reasonably well-settled law."' 8
The fact that Children's Fund's actions in this case or TRSs in
general do not currently constitute beneficial ownership under Rule
13d-3 does not prevent the SEC from creating rules that provide
otherwise.
This Recent Development argues that beneficial
ownership should be expanded to cover economic interests in shares
derived from total return equity swaps, but in a manner that creates
certainty and provides clear standards for guidance in the future. The
court's decision here failed to do that; instead it created the opposite
effect by replacing what was considered settled law with a novel
interpretation that provides little in the way of future guidance. Any
law finding beneficial ownership in the long party to a TRS should
not come from the courts, but from the SEC.
III. THE NEED FOR SEC ACTION

The sizable market presence of activist hedge funds and their use
of derivative products to influence corporate governance necessitate
SEC action.0 9 Prior to the court's decision in CSX Corp., market
participants based their trading strategies on what they believed to be
a well-established legal truth: total return equity swaps do not trigger
section 13(d) disclosure requirements." 0 In spite of the court's
statements to the contrary,"' the decision will create confusion and
uncertainty in the market as a new body of law is developed based on
the court's holding."' The scope of the problem and the required
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. For a thorough analysis of the failure of the current regulatory environment to
address growing concerns about the separation of economic and voting interests in stock
through derivatives and its impact on corporate governance, see generally Hu & Black,
supra note 32, and Hu & Black, supranote 69.
110. See Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 868; SEC Letter, supra note 62.
111. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 547
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd, 2008 WL 4222848 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2008) ("[T]he Court is inclined
to the view that the Cassandra-like predictions of dire consequences of holding that
[Children's Fund] has beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a) have been
exaggerated.... The issue here, moreover, is novel and hardly settled. And markets can
well adapt regardless of how it ultimately is resolved.").
112. See ISDA Brief, supra note 59, at 25-29; SEC Letter, supra note 62.
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changes in existing market practices warrant a broad and consistent
solution, one the SEC is particularly well situated to provide. The

most effective way to address the secret accumulation of interests in
securities through equity swaps is SEC expansion of beneficial
ownership under Rule 13d-3 to include economic interests arising
from TRS contracts.

3

Furthermore, applying the standard set out in CSX Corp. on a
case-by-case basis would be virtually impossible and certainly
impractical."

All swap participants will have to reevaluate each of

their positions in light of the court's dicta concerning the definition of
beneficial ownership in Rule 13d-3(a) and its ruling on beneficial
ownership under Rule 13d-3(b)." 5 Swap participants will have to
ascertain the amount of "influence" they have over their
counterparties

and determine whether it could be considered

beneficial ownership by a court adhering to the CSX Corp. guidance
regarding Rule 13d-3(a). 116

Complicating the swap participant's

analysis is the fact that the court did not provide clear guidelines on
what is and is not a sufficient level of influence. 7 Additionally,
participants will have to evaluate whether its swaps amount to an
accumulation of securities as part of a "scheme to evade" disclosure
113. There is general agreement that the SEC could properly expand Rule 13d-3's
definition of beneficial ownership in this manner. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 550;
Commissioners' Brief, supra note 98, at 25-27; ISDA Brief, supra note 59 at 11; Hu &
Black, supra note 32, at 888-90. Section 23(a) of the Exchange Act grants the SEC power
to enact regulations needed to accomplish the enabling legislation's goals. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78w(a) (2006). A regulation promulgated under this power "will be sustained so long as
it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' " Mourning v. Family
Pub. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268,
280-81 (1969)). The court agreed, stating that "the SEC ... has the power to treat as
beneficial ownership a situation that would not fall within the statutory meaning of that
term." CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 551. Thus, while Children's Fund's situation does
not qualify as beneficial ownership under the current terms of Rule 13d-3, it would be
reasonable, in light of the enabling legislation's purpose, for the SEC to specifically
designate it as such. See id. at 551-52 ("The purpose of [slection 13(d) is to alert
shareholders of 'every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, regardless of
technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in corporate control.' "
(quoting GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972)); Commissioners' Brief, supra note 98, at 26; Hu & Black, supra note 32, at 888-90
(indicating that the SEC could regulate the hidden (morphable) ownership created by
equity swaps, but recommending against it in fear that such regulation would amount to
over regulation).
114. See ISDA Brief, supra note 59, at 25-29.
115. Id. at 26; see also SEC Letter, supra note 62 (discussing the "significant
uncertainties" that would be created by interpreting "beneficial ownership ... to include
shares used in a counter-party's hedge").
116. ISDA Brief, supra note 59, at 26.
117. Id.
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requirements, which as a result of the court's holding constitutes
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(b)." 8 SEC guidance declaring
that the long party in a TRS is beneficial owner of the counterparty's
shares held as a hedge would eliminate the need to monitor positions
in this manner by removing any uncertainty.
As a national regulatory body, the SEC can provide overarching,
standardized solutions that are impossible to achieve through judicial
interpretation and case law. "9 SEC regulation tends to be "rule
based," which affords the opportunity to establish an exact
standard.12 It is also the result of "a responsive deliberative process,"
which tends to be "more nuanced, targeted, and globally consistent
than regulation issued on a case-by-case basis."' 21 Additionally, in
promulgating new rules, the SEC actively seeks input from all parties
affected, which often increases support for the new regulation.1 2 The
end result is regulation that is crafted after considering "thousands of
comments" from a variety of interested parties. 123 Further, the weight
of authority that SEC action carries is unrivaled by that of a district
court decision.124 SEC action addresses the shortcomings associated
with the court's decision by creating a definite national solution. Such
action will create a consistent standard and enable market
participants to adjust their investment strategies accordingly.
SEC expansion of Rule 13d-3's beneficial ownership definition to
cover economic interests in securities arising from total return equity
swaps also would be consistent with other countries' solutions to the
same problem.125
New Australian rules "require immediate
disclosure of all equity derivative positions of [five percent] or more
whenever there is a transaction that affects or is likely to affect
control or potential control of the subject company or the acquisition
of a substantial interest in a company."' 26 In July 2008, the United
Kingdom adopted a rule that requires investors to add derivative
118. Id.
119. Davidoff, supra note 20, at 266.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775,
801-02 (2006).
123. Id. at 802.
124. Davidoff, supra note 20, at 266.
125. See Savitt, supra note 5 (indicating that Australia and the United Kingdom have
recently promulgated rules that include swap positions in the determination of security
ownership levels).
126. Id. (citing AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS PANEL, GUIDANCE NOTE 20: EQUITY
DERIVATIVES (April 11, 2008), www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Guidance-Notes/Current
downloads/GN20 2008.pdf).
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positions to stock ownership in determining total ownership for its
mass accumulation disclosure requirements. 127 These regulations
indicate a global convergence regarding the treatment of equity swap
positions. The SEC should follow suit by explicitly expanding the
definition of beneficial ownership to include interests derived from
equity swaps for purposes of section 13(d) disclosure requirements.
CONCLUSION

The situation presented in CSX Corp. is merely one aspect of a
much larger problem involving the inadequate regulation of hedge
funds and derivative products. As evidenced by their role in the
current market crisis, this is an area in desperate need of further
government oversight. The court in CSX Corp. attempted to address
such issues, but, unfortunately, overstepped its bounds in doing so
and most likely caused more harm to the markets than good. In
reaching its decision, the court inappropriately expanded the scope of
Rule 13d-3, finding beneficial ownership in a situation in which the
plain language of the Rule, precedent, and SEC guidance suggested
otherwise. The court was right in wanting to see the scope of Rule
13d-3 expanded to include Children's Fund's actions, but wrong in
expanding it on its own. Such expansion needs to come from the SEC
in order to create a consistent national standard to guide
corporations, shareholders, and market participants.
BRIAN

T. SULLIVAN

127. Id. In the United Kingdom, investors are required to file disclosures when
ownership exceeds three percent. Id.
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